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THE LANGUAGE OF SUPREME COURT BRIEFS:
A LARGE-SCALE QUANTITATIVE INVESTIGATION
Brady Coleman* and Quy Phung**
I. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
In 2003, we initiated a long-term project to investigate
empirically the language used in United States Supreme Court
briefs.' The exploratory stage was open-ended, largely without
any particular results initially sought or predicted. We wanted to
collect and categorize as much linguistic data from Supreme
Court briefs as possible, and analyze such data as thoroughly as
we could-and let the results lead to possible topics for
publication, rather than vice versa. Indeed, at times we hoped
(admittedly with quite a bit of skepticism) that we might find
statistically significant differences between the linguistic styles
of winning and losing briefs, and be able to offer profitable

* Professor of Human Rights, Faculty of Law, International Islamic University, Islamabad,
Pakistan; M.A. (Applied Linguistics, University of Leicester 1998); J.D. (Harlan Fiske
Stone Scholar, Columbia University 1989); B.A. (summa cum laude, Amherst College
1985).
** J.D. (South Texas College of Law, 2006); Ph.D. (Molecular Biology, Johns Hopkins
2000); B.A. (University of Pennsylvania, 1995).
1. This project would not have been possible without the generous funding and
foresight provided by South Texas College of Law, which saw a natural link between its
award-winning and top-ranked advocacy and legal writing programs, and the first-ever
large-scale empirical project devoted to a linguistic analysis of written advocacy before the
United States Supreme Court. Much of the funding came in the form of compensation for
student research assistants to download briefs and to develop software programs designed
specifically for this project. The project also won a competitive scholarship award of
$2,500 in 2007 from the Association of Legal Writing Directors which made the final
stages of the project possible. We are indebted not only to STCL and the ALWD, but also
to Chng Huang Hoon, Connor Graham, Joseph Kimble, Kim Seon Kyoung, Monica Ortale,
Philip Page, Jim Paulsen, Lisa Sotir, Dru Stevenson, Cherie Taylor, John Worley, Roland
Yap, and Andrew Solomon, and research assistants Jerry Canady, DeAnna Carlson, Zahra
Jivani, Shakeb Syed, Mary Vu, Sarah Willms, and Emily Byrum, as well as those STCL
faculty present at a 2005 forum to critically discuss this project.
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advice for practitioners based on such information. But even
without any unrealistic Holy Grail outcomes, we nonetheless
were confident such a study would be able to provide useful
advice to legal practitioners and educators, as well as possibly
interesting outcomes for scholars of legal advocacy or
linguistics. Our first publication, in the American Journal of
Trial Advocacy,2 was based on a less complete database, and
was narrower in scope, because it focused on the language of
only one short component of the brief, the question presented.
Still, this earlier article did find interesting relationships between
linguistic and other variables (time, party, and the like) in
Supreme Court briefs, and concluded with advice for Court
advocates.
The scope of the current article is more extensive. Our
database consists of nearly every brief on the merits presented to
the Court for the thirty-five years between 1969 and 2004.4 We
initially downloaded about 9,000 briefs, and then chopped them
up for analysis into about a quarter of a million separate brief
components such as Table of Contents, Table of Authorities,
Summary of Argument, and the like. To clean up and analyze
the briefs, eight original PERL software programs were written
for this project. We decided to download every brief, rather than
a smaller number based on an appropriate statistical sampling,
for two reasons. For one, downloading every brief allowed us to
sidestep any sampling concerns in the first place. But more
importantly, although our database is comprehensive for our
purposes, we were curious about how style might vary
depending on a large number of legal issues, and of course even
with a full set of briefs over thirty-five years, some legal issues
appear rarely (or not at all).

2. Brady Coleman, Quy Phung, DeAnna Carlson, Zahra Jivani & Shakeb Syed,
Grammatical and Structural Choices in Issue Framing: A Quantitative Analysis of
'Questions Presented' from a Half Century of Supreme Court Briefs, 29 Amer. J. Tr.
Advoc. 327 (2005).
3. See generally id.
4. We excluded amicus briefs and reply briefs, and any merit briefs that were not
included in WestLaw's otherwise comprehensive database. Our database ends with the
2004 term because the ALLCOURT database also ended at this time when we were
conducting the research. That database has of course been updated since our research was
completed.
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A. Other EmpiricalStudies of the Language ofLegal Advocacy
Our project is certainly not the first to use quantitative
methods to investigate the language of written (or oral) legal
advocacy. The first published work that applied computational
linguistics to analyze the language of judicial briefs focused on
the University of Michigan affirmative action litigation, as
decided by the Supreme Court in Gratz v. Bollinger5 and Grutter
v. Bollinger.6 Over a hundred amicus briefs had been filed in
these companion cases, so the authors had a healthy corpus of
advocacy language for analysis. Using programs that counted
the appearance of key words in each brief, they were able to
show that quantitative methods alone could successfully predict
the policy positions that were being advocated; statistically
significant differences were found in the language of amicus
briefs supporting the respondent, as opposed to amicus briefs
supporting the petitioner. In other work, scholars have usefully
polled large numbers of active judges to ascertain what stylistic
factors in appellate briefs are most favored and disfavored by
decisionmakers. 8 Empirical work has also found positive
relationships between success and attorney qualifications in oral
arguments before the Supreme Court of Canada. 9
5. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
6. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
7. Michael Evans, Wayne McIntosh, Cynthia Cates & Jimmy Lin, Recounting the
Courts? Toward A Text-Centered Computational Approach to Understanding the

Dynamics of the Judicial System (unpublished ms., presented at Annual Meeting, Midwest
Political Sci. Assn., Chicago, Apr. 9, 2005) (available at http://www.umiacs.umd.edu/
-digidock/publications/Evans-etal-MPSA2005.pdf) (accessed Mar. 3, 2010; copy on file
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process); see also Katherine O'Harra Vigilante,
Virginia Hettinger & Christopher Zorn, Legal Arguments and Supreme Court Decision
Making: An Experimental Approach (unpublished ms., presented at Annual Meeting,

Midwest Political Sci. Assn., Chicago, Apr. 21, 2001) (copy on file with authors).
8. See e.g. David Lewis, What's the Diference? Comparingthe Advocacy Preferences
of State and FederalAppellate Judges, 7 J. App. Prac. & Process 335 (2005); David Lewis,
Common Knowledge about Appellate Briefs: True or False? 6 J. App. Prac. & Process 331

(2004); Charles A. Bird & Webster Burke Kinnaird, Objective Analysis of Advocacy
Preferences and Prevalent Mythologies in One CaliforniaAppellate Court, 4 J. App. Prac.

& Process 141 (2002); Robert W. Benson & Joan B. Kessler, Legalese v. Plain English: An
EmpiricalStudy of Persuasion and Credibility in Appellate Brief Writing, 20 Loy. L.A. L.

Rev. 301 (1987).
9. See John Szmer, Susan W. Johnson & Tammy A. Sarver, Convincing the Court:
Two Studies of Advocacy: Does the Lawyer Matter? Influencing the Outcomes on the

Supreme Court of Canada, 41 L. & Socy. Rev. 279 (2007). These studies did not separate
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Only recently has the United States Supreme Court allowed
oral argument transcripts to be released that identify a Justice by
name in recording questions they pose to advocates. Previously,
they had been identified generically in the transcripts (as
"Justice"). With such information, we are attempting (in a
separate study) to determine if the language used in oral
argument questions can be quantified to predict later judicial
votes. This study was initiated based on the relatively
uncontroversial assumption that judicial attitudes towards
litigant positions (as revealed through linguistic variables) are
often well established before oral arguments are held, and so the
use of language by each Justice during oral argument
questioning should reveal psychological biases.' 0 But even
before such transcripts were available, Supreme Court scholars
had been using more labor intensive methods to empirically
compare the language used in oral arguments to other
variables." In sum, the current project might be viewed as a
natural follow up to existing work: Large scale empirical studies
of the language of legal advocacy have just become achievable
at low cost; until recently, our project would have been
extremely time-consuming and/or very expensive. We were able
to benefit from access to comparatively large (and importantly,
freely provided to legal academics) databases on Westlaw,
combined with computer programs we created to clean up,
categorize, and analyze such briefs, to automate the processing
of millions of bits of data.12
style from substance, so the results may be a function of argument (content) rather than
language.
10. Wayne McIntosh, Michael Evans, Brady Coleman & Mary Vu, PredictingSupreme
Court Decisionsfrom a Linguistic Analysis of Justice Questions during Oral Arguments

(forthcoming). These databases have also been mined to determine which Justice elicits the
most laughter during oral argument. See Jay D. Wexler, Laugh Track, 9 Green Bag 2d 59
(2005).
I1. See e.g. Timothy R. Johnson, Information, Oral Arguments, and Supreme Court
Decision Making, 29 Am. Pol. Research 331 (2001); see also Sarah Levien Shullman, The
Illusion of Devil's Advocacy: How the Justices of the Supreme Court Foreshadow their
Decisions during Oral Argument, 6 J. App. Prac. & Process 271 (2004); cf Kathleen A.
Bergin, Sexualized Advocacy: The Ascendant Backlash againstFemale Lawyers, 18 Yale J.

L. & Feminism 191 (2006) (relying on empirical work to analyze communicative advocacy
in extra-linguistic forms).
12. Although not concerned with legal language used persuasively, quantitative studies
in the general area of legal language continue to proliferate with the explosive growth of
digitized corpora. See e.g. Kevin T. McGuire & Georg Vanberg, Mapping the Policies of
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B. Databasesand Methodology
1. Databases
We began by downloading the briefs and tagging them with
unique identification numbers so that we could precisely link
sets of variables to each other. Our database included two
categories of variables: those generated with our own software,
and those imported from The Supreme Court Database, better
known as ALLCOURT.13 The ALLCOURT database, funded by
the National Science Foundation, contains final vote data from
the beginning of the Warren Court (in 1953) and is updated
periodically to include the current Court's last complete term.
The variables coded by the database are so specific that
they allow Supreme Court scholars to study a great array of
empirical issues (the relative unanimity of Court decisions under
different Chief Justices; the positive or negative votes of a
particular Justice when the petitioner is a consumer, a creditor,
or a criminal defendant; the relative success of respondents in
civil rights cases; and so on). Published work that has made use
of the database (predicting, for example, outcomes of decisions
based on earlier voting patterns of Justices) generally supports a
view of the Supreme Court decisionmaking process as
ideological rather than legal.14 In any case, we recognized that
the US. Supreme Court: Data, Opinions and Constitutional Law, (unpublished ms.,

presented at Annual Meeting, Am. Political Sci. Assn., Washington, Sept. 1, 2005) (copy
on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process) (using recent innovations in content
analysis to estimate judicial ideology from an algorithm that counts certain key terms in
justices' opinions); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Which Judges Write Their Opinions
(and Should We Care?), 32 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 1077 (2005) (attempting to determine
whether judges or their law clerks write judicial opinions by measuring stylistic variables);
Brady Coleman, Lord Denning and Justice Cardozo: The Judge as Poet-Philosopher,32

Rutgers L.J. 485 (2001) (comparing quantitatively measured judicial style to judicial
philosophy); Martin Horwitz & Orlando do Campo, When and How the Supreme Court
Found Democracy-A Computer Study, 14 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 1 (1994) (counting the
number of times the term "democracy" appears in decades of Supreme Court opinions to
form hypotheses about judicial ideology and American political history).
13. The Supreme Court Database, http://scdb.wustl.edu (noting that ALLCOURTS
contains "over two hundred pieces of information about each case decided by the Court,"
including "the identity of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed, the parties
to the suit, the legal provisions considered in the case, and the votes of the Justices")
(accessed Mar. 8, 2010; title page on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
14. Theodore W. Ruger, Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, The
Supreme Court ForecastingProject: Legal and PoliticalScience Approaches to Predicting

80

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

the database could also be very useful for a linguistic-rather
than only a political science or legal-investigation, because it
would allow us to compare variations in language (including
readability) to the variables that the ALLCOURT database had
teased out of decades of Supreme Court opinions (with
significant effort and expenditure). Since the freely
downloadable ALLCOURT database had already coded
Supreme Court opinions as involving certain legal issues, with
certain outcomes, and certain histories, we could link our
database to it and then ask questions about the relationship of
readability to these procedural, substantive, outcome, and other
relevant variables. Thus, to offer one illustration, because the
ALLCOURT database includes a code for the vote ultimately
taken in each case, linking to ALLCOURT allowed us to
automatically generate data comparing the readability of briefs
to the vote count of the decision. Figure 1 illustrates graphically
the links between different sets of variables for analysis in our
MS-EXCEL relational database management system.
FIGURE 1
Screen Capture: Linked Variables

Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1150 (2004); Howard Gillman,
What's Law Got to Do with It? JudicialBehaviorists Test the "Legal Model" of Judicial
Decision Making, 26 L. & Soc. Inquiry 465 (2001); Harold J. Spaeth & Jeffrey A. Segal,
Majority Rule or Minority Will: Adherence to Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court
(Cambridge U. Press 1999).
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2. Methodology
After downloading the briefs, we faced two chief
methodological challenges to prepare them for our own (not the
ALLCOURT) database. First, we realized that any investigation
into linguistic style that was going to automatically work with
the millions of words in our database (to derive average sentence
length, number of letters per word, and so on) would not be
accurate if it attempted to include the many citations to authority
that appear in Supreme Court briefs. How would our automated
program count abbreviations for statutes, cases, and the like? As
complete words? As something else? And how would the
punctuation in string citations, for example, be interpreted for
purposes of determining where sentences began and ended?
Rather than struggle with this problem, particularly because it
seemed irrelevant to the question of readability itself, we
decided upon an automated process to eliminate the citations.
But in addition to eliminating the citations, we wanted to keep a
place marker for where the citations had been, so we ultimately
developed a program to replace every citation with the term
"scite." Because "scite" has five letters (which is also
consistently the average length of words in briefs), including it
does not significantly influence our results.
The second major challenge was to develop a program to
automatically separate the briefs into different components for
analysis. We hypothesized that even if certain linguistic quirks
were not apparent in the Argument sections of briefs, they might
be revealed in more idiosyncratic patterns found in the
Statement of Facts component, to provide one illustration. Or
maybe information about the average length of the Summary of
Argument section (which is not specified in the Supreme Court's
rules) would prove useful to advocates writing such sections, to
offer another illustration.
C. Limitations
Many, if not most, modern Supreme Court briefs are the
product of more than one authorial style. Several attorneys in a
firm or government organization typically work on a brief to be
submitted to the high court, and each attorney might draft
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different parts of the document, or at least make editorial
changes to a brief that was initially drafted by only one attorney.
That briefs are a committee product argued against choosing
them for comparative stylistic analysis, or so we were
concerned, because style might be ironed out with so many
contributing authors. By comparison, lower court documents
(memoranda in support of motions for summary judgment, for
example) would presumably reveal the style of a writer more
accurately. Or, rather than choosing advocacy documents, we
considered looking at law review articles, or judicial opinions,
over time. But while these other variants of legal text have
advantages as choices for analysis, they also have disadvantages.
The authorship of judicial opinions, for example, is complicated
by uncertainties about the role of judicial clerks in the writing
process for some percentage of judges.15 Ultimately, however,
there were two decisive reasons for choosing Supreme Court
briefs over other possibilities: 1) the low cost and easy
availability of Supreme Court briefs covering a fairly long time
period (as opposed to lower court documents, for example, at
least as of the year we began the project); and 2) our ability to
add a wealth of variables to our analysis by linking our briefs to
the sophisticated ALLCOURT database.
Moreover, the present article is limited to an investigation
of readability scores and related calculations. Inevitably, with so
much data, we were interested in a quantitative rather than a
qualitative analysis, and readability scores are well-suited to
such an analysis because of their algorithmic expression. 16In
addition to readability, however, we were able to generate data
on five common measures of plain legal English: (1) stuffy
terms that often have plainer counterparts, like "abutting,"
"commence,". "multitudinous," and "necessitous"; (2) compound
constructions that usually can be expressed in a plainer way, like
"during the period from," "with regard to," "because of the fact

15. See Choi & Gulati, supra n. 12.
16. Cf

Feng Li, Annual Report Readability,

Current Earnings, and Earnings

Persistence (Ross School of Business Paper No. 1028, 2006) (concluding, from
quantitative analysis of readability scores, that corporate executives may make annual
reports difficult to read in an attempt to hide adverse information from investors) (available
at http://ssm.conmabstract-887382 (accessed Mar. 8, 2010; copy on file with Journal of

Appellate Practice and Process)).
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that"; (3) redundant legal phrases like "false and untrue," "aid
and abet," and "give, devise and bequeath"; (4) "lawyerisms"
like "hereby," "aforesaid," and "wherein"; and (5) Latinisms
like "id est," "ad quod damnum," and "de lege lata".17
D. ReadabilityFormulas:Flesch, SMOG, Fog, and Kincaid
For nearly a century, publishers, editors, and writers have
developed readability formulas to derive a measure of how
difficult it is to read some quantity of text. Of the dozens of such
formulas that have been created, many use sentence length and
word length as proxies for syntactical and semantic difficulty,
while others count syllables or employ a databank of words with
a previously determined level of complexity. Naturally, there are
monosyllabic words and short sentences that are actually more
challenging than their longer counterpoints (and vice versa), but
with a large enough sample of written language, such exceptions
are ironed out as a general rule. Unsurprisingly, readability
scores are heavily used by publishers of academic textbooks,
and several of the formulas generate a number representing the
grade level required by the reader: A score of twelve would, for
example, indicate reading material appropriate for high school
seniors, while a score of fourteen would indicate material
appropriate for college sophomores.
To take one example of these readability ratings, the
formula for the Flesch Reading Ease Score test is expressed as:
206.835 -1.015

Ctotal
total words

-84.6

total syllables

total words )
sentences)
Note that in the results of the Flesch test, higher scores indicate
material that is easier to read; lower numbers mark harder-toread passages.' 8
17. We hope eventually to write a follow-up article that will present the results of these
changes in lexical choice over time and as found in different brief components, and that
also will indicate whether there is any relationship between their usage and the legal
issue(s) in a case. We have so far been unable to get a count of passive verbs-another
common measure of plain English-to work with our database, but we hope to produce
such a count before we publish our next article using the same database.
18. Users of Microsoft Word 2007 can check the FRES scores of their documents by
clicking the Microsoft Office button; clicking "Word Options"; clicking "Proofing"; and
then selecting the check boxes for "Check grammar with spelling" and "Show readability
statistics." See Microsoft Office Online, Help and How-to,

Test Your Document's
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The "Simple Measure of Gobbledygook" or "SMOG"
formula,' 9 is expressed below:
number of polysyllables x

30

number of sentences)

3

When the SMOG algorithm is applied to a sample, it produces a
strong correlation to the grade level for which 100-percent
comprehension will be achieved.
The Gunning Fog Index ("Fog") is expressed in the
following equation:
0.4*

words

+100 complex words

sentence)

words

The Fog, like the SMOG, yields results correlated with grade
levels. And it can be applied to any piece of writing-not just
grade-school textbooks-with comic books scoring at a sixthgrade reading level and The Atlantic Monthly at the reading level
of a senior in high school.2 0
The Flesch-Kincaid ("Kincaid" or "Flesch-Kincaid") grade
level formula is written as follows:
0.39

totalwords )+11.
total sentences)

totalsyllables -15.59
total words

Again, the result is a number that corresponds with a grade level.
For example, a score of 8.2 would indicate that the text is
expected to be understandable by a student in eighth grade.2 1
Readability, http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/help/HP101485061033.aspx (accessed Apr.
22, 2010; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
19. See G. Harry McLaughlin, SMOG Grading-A New Readability Formula, J. of
Reading 639 (May 1969).
20. Robert Gunning, The Technique of Clear Writing 40 (rev. ed., McGraw-Hill Book
Co. 1968) (including readability chart for general-interest magazines). Readers interested in
calculating the Fog Index for their own writing can apply the formula in this way:
One: Jot down the number of words in successive sentences. If the piece is long,
you may wish to take several samples of 100 words. ... Divide the total number
of words in the passage by the number of sentences. This gives the average
sentence length of the passage.
Two: Count the number of words of three syllables or more per 100 words. Don't
count the words (1) that are proper names, (2) that are combinations of short
easy words (like "bookkeeper". . .), (3) that are verb forms made three syllables
by adding -ed or -es (like "created". . . ). This gives you the percentage of hard
words in the passage.
Three: To get the Fog Index, total the two factors just counted and multiply by 4.
Id. at 38.
21. Like the FRES, the Flesch-Kincaid can be calculated automatically for documents
created in Microsoft Word. See Microsoft Office Online, n. 18, supra.
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Although readability scores were initially created to
improve publishing and editorial decisions about targeting
specific markets or audiences, scholars have also employed them
for other purposes. A recent large-scale study of corporate
reports, for example, found a relationship between the linguistic
style used in the reports, and the recent financial performance of
the company.22 The study analyzed a sample of more than
55,000 company reporting years using the FOG and Kincaid
readability formulas, and theorized that managers, whether
consciously or subconsciously, obfuscate poor financial
performance with less readable annual reports.2 3
Because the different formulas typically generate different
scores, we compare three of them, the "Flesch Reading Ease,"
the "Gunning Fog," and the "Flesch-Kincaid," to analyze the
readability of Supreme Court briefs. Moreover, although it
might appear an obvious matter, we should justify our
assumption that algorithmic measures of readability are related
to plain legal English. There are many possibilities about how
legal language achieves plainness. Is it the level of brevity,
credibilit accuracy, aesthetic appeal, comprehension-even
precision -that makes legal language more or less plain? Does
plainness have to do with the length of sentences or the length of
words (as both are emphasized in the published readability
formulas)? Or is plain legal English more concerned with the
amount of jargon, Latinisms, redundant expressions, or even the
size of margins on a page? Lacking one established authority
that defines the characteristics of plain legal English, we
consulted a recent summary of expert views. 2 5 This compilation
of characteristics included advice that would not have been
detected by our program (use concrete nouns as subjects,
punctuate carefully) as well as elements that relate directly to
readability scores (keep sentences short, cut unnecessary
words).2 6

22. Li, supra n. 16.
23. Id. at 3-4.
24. See Brady Coleman, Are Clarity and Precision Compatible Aims in Legal

Drafting? 1998 Singapore J. of Leg. Studies 376 (1998).
25. Wayne Schiess, What Plain English Really Is, 9 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 43 (2004).
26. Id. at 71-72.
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II. THE ANALYSIS: READABILITY AND FLING PARTY
Does the language of legal briefs presented to the Supreme
Court, as measured using our quantitative methodology,
correlate at all to the issue(s) of law being argued to the Court,
or to the parties involved in the litigation? Put differently, did
we find evidence to support the presumably intuitive notion that
more complex areas of legal subject matter would show different
linguistic patterns than less technical legal subjects? Skeptical
readers must already be wondering how we could possibly
distinguish some areas of Supreme Court jurisprudence-much
of it necessarily involving arcane areas of Constitutional law, for
example-as especially complex.27 The short response is that we
did not so attempt; we approached the problem from the
opposite direction, at least initially. That is, we had our database
generate a list of legal subjects ranked in order from the most
readable to the least readable, using among other linguistic
measures such markers as the average length of sentences and
the total number of words. And then we considered whether the
list suggested any meaningful patterns. 28
Overall, as the outcomes below reveal, we found that there
was an interesting pattern of relationships between the variations
in certain linguistic measures in the briefs, on the one hand, and
three sets of variables in the ALLCOURT database, on the other
hand: law, legal issue, and party.29 However, we present only

27. But see Seth J. Chandler, The Network Structure of Supreme Court Jurisprudence
(Univ. of Houston Law Center No. 2005-W-01) (arguing that the First Amendment is the
most complex area of Supreme Court jurisprudence) (available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=742065 (accessed Mar. 9, 2010; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process)); see also Scott P. Johnson, The Influence of Case
Complexity on the Opinion Writing of the Rehnquist Court, 25 Ohio N. U. L. Rev. 45
(1999).
28. These results are presented below in section II.A. And after finding suggestive
patterns, we tested several hypotheses, which we present below in section II.B.
29. A subtle distinction between law and legal issue was considered necessary by the
creators of the ALLCOURT database. The investigators for the ALLCOURT project
ultimately responsible for the coding describe the difference between the two variables as
follows:
[The legal issue] variable identifies the issue for each decision. Although criteria
for the identification of issues are hard to articulate, the focus here is on the
subject matter of the controversy (e.g., sex discrimination, school desegregation,
affirmative action) rather than its legal basis (e.g., the equal protection clause).
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results based on the party variable in this article, both because of
space constraints and because the party variable was related to
the law and legal issue variables in generally predictable ways.
For example, if briefs written for parties involved in criminal
cases tended to be written with fewer complex words, then the
same was generally true when the law or legal issue involved
criminal matters. Thus, to display results for each of the three
variables would have been largely redundant because of the
overlap between them.
A. Parties: "Bottom Up" Analysis
The ALLCOURT database codes parties according to
dozens upon dozens of possibilities, including everything from
the highly specific (e.g., "AMTRAK" and "SENATOR") to the
much more generic and common (e.g., "UNITED STATES,"
"DEFENDANT," and "FEMALE"). We initially ranked the two
major brief components (ARGUMENT and STATEMENT OF
FACTS) according to different linguistic scores to see which
kinds of parties would appear as outliers, by having the highest
and lowest scores for each of the linguistic categories in our
database. We discovered that the readability scores were similar
enough, when investigating their relationship to party, to justify
our using only one of them, the Flesch-Kincaid index, as
representative of the other two indices (the Flesch and the
Fog). 30 However, in addition to the Flesch-Kincaid index, we
also ranked parties according to their scores on the "average
percentage of complex words" linguistic variable. This complex[The legal issue] variable identifies issues on the basis of the Court's own
statements as to what the case is about. The objective is to categorize the case
from a public policy standpoint, a perspective that the [law variable] commonly
disregards.
Unlike the [law variable] where the number of legal provisions at issue has no
preordained upper bound, each legal provision should not generally have more
than a single issue applied to it. A second issue should apply only when a
preference for one rather than the other cannot readily be made. Of the many
thousand records in the database, few have a legal basis for decision that applies
to a second issue.
Harold Spaeth et.al. Supreme Court Database Codebook (Rel. 1 2009) 41, http://scdb.wustl
.edul brickFiles/2009_O/SCDB_2009_01_codebook.pdf (accessed Apr. 21, 2010; copy on
file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
30. We use all three indices for our historical analysis in Section III, below.
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words variable had analogous outcomes to the three readability
formulas, but the results were different enough to justify
presenting it separately.31 Complex words are words with three
or more syllables, but our program did not count as complex any
proper nouns or compound words, nor did it count common
suffixes as syllables. Even after the briefs have been sorted into
"PARTY" categories, there are still hundreds of records, so we
present only the ten outliers on each end of the spectrum.
Tables 1 and 2 identify the parties with the lowest
percentage of complex words, and the lowest Flesch-Kincaid
scores, while Tables 3 and 4 identify parties with the highest
percentage of complex words and the highest Flesch-Kincaid
scores. Because our data contained separate entries for petitioner
and respondent briefs, we include both categories in the tables.
Thus, in Table 1, for all petitioner briefs, the party with the
lowest percentage of complex words in its fact statement is
"Oregon"; for respondent briefs, "Kentucky" has the lowest
percentage. So, the table should not be misread into suggesting
that the first two entries on the first row involved cases where
Oregon and Kentucky were opposing parties in litigation; rather,
these parties represent different sets of Supreme Court briefs.
And in all Tables, the parties are listed in rank order: The party
whose brief contained the lowest percentage of complex words
in each category is listed first.
TABLE 1
Parties with Lowest Percentage of Complex Words in Briefs
ARGUMENT
FACTS
Respondent
Respondent
Petitioner
Petitioner
Oregon
Arrestee
Poor Defendant
Father
Juvenile
Michigan
Texas
Inventor
Out of State
Person Convicted

Kentucky
Arizona
Louisiana
South Carolina
Wisconsin
Florida
Texas
Georgia
Virginia
Mother

Debtor
Arrestee
Oklahoma Commn.
Inventor
Washington Dept.
Texas School Dist.
Reporter
Minority Job Applicant
Farmer
Minority Student

South Carolina
Oregon
Minority Person
U.S. Judge
Wisconsin
Union Member
Taxpayer
Debtor
Georgia
Mississippi

31. See pp. 88-90, infra.
32. We ignored outcomes that were based on a small sample size of fewer than six
briefs.
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TABLE 2
Parties with Lowest Flesch-Kincaid Scores in Briefs
ARGUMENT
FACTS
Petitioner
South Dakota
Poor Defendant
Texas City
Missouri
Massachusetts Official
Student
Bankrupt
Developer
Massachusetts
Spouse

Petitioner

Respondent
Arizona
South Carolina
Wisconsin
Arrestee
Louisiana
OWCP
Govt. Contractor
Child
Dept. of Justice
Maryland

3

OWCP
Voter
Truck
Business
Dept. of Justice
Seller
Arizona
Illinois Dept.
Minority Student
Wisconsin

Respondent
Arrestee
South Dakota
Mine
Texas City
Protestor/Picketer
State Commission
Airline
Out of state
Nuclear
South Carolina

Tables 3 and 4, which show the parties whose briefs were
the least readable and contained the most complex words, are
strikingly dominated by federal government agencies as parties,
or parties typically considered to have more resources
("shipper," "railroad," "drug manufacturer"). Tables 1 and 2, on
the opposite end of the linguistic spectrum, are heavily
overrepresented by parties (1) with presumably fewer resources,
("inventor," "debtor"), (2) who are members of minority groups
("minority job applicant," "minority student"), or (3) who are
criminal defendants ("arrestee," "person convicted"). Curiously,
moreover, southern states as parties are especially prevalent in
Tables 1 and 2. There are scattered exceptions: the Department
of Justice appears twice in Table 2 as a party; Table 4 includes
both "minority student" and "disabled" as parties. But the basic
pattern was strong enough to suggest hypotheses for us to test in
a "top down" analysis.
TABLE 3
Parties with Highest Percentage of Complex Words in Briefs
ARGUMENT
FACTS
Petitioner
FEC
Television
Dept of State
HEW
Dept. of Trans.
INS

Petitioner

Respondent
FCC
Public Utility
State Commission
Insurance Company
Reporter
FERC

FEC
FPC
AGRI
INS
DOS
FCC

33. Office of Worker's Compensation Programs.

Respondent
FLRA
FEC
FERC
Public Utility
FCC
GSA
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TABLE 3 (continued)
Parties with Highest Percentage of Complex Words in Briefs
ARGUMENT
FACTS
Petitioner
Respondent
Petitioner
Respondent
FERC
LABR
Kentucky Official
Bookseller/Printer

FLRA
Hospital
Iowa Commission
Medical Claimant

LBR
Attorney General
Dept. of Trans.
HEW

Hospital
Reporter
HHS
COMN

TABLE 4
Parties with Highest Flesch-Kincaid Scores in Briefs
ARGUMENT
FACTS
Respondent
Petitioner
Respondent
Petitioner
Shipper
Father
Seller
Railroad
Fishing entity
New Jersey
Union Member
Illinois City
California County
Builder

Minority student
Offeror
Parent
State Commission
FCC
Theater
New York
Insurer
Public Utility
School

FPC
Los Angeles Official
Michigan
Heir
California County
Television
California Commission
Drug Manufacturer
Network
Public Utility

Bookseller/Printer
Oklahoma
Gay
Disabled
Hospital
FERC
Public Utility
HEW
Govt. Employee
Wife

B. Parties: Top Down Analysis
We tested five different hypotheses, derived from our initial
"bottom up" analysis, and approaching the "parties" variable
from the opposite direction to confirm apparent patterns. Again,
in the "bottom up" analysis, above, we queried our database to
rank parties in ascending order based on the numerical value of
linguistic variables (such as our three readability indices). For
the "top down" analysis, on the other hand, we identified parties
that fell within a certain area of interest, and identified which of
those parties fell below or above the median for all parties for a
particular linguistic variable. For example, half of all parties will
fall below the median score on each of our readability indices,
necessarily, and half will fall above the median. Our test for
significance was relatively straightforward, if difficult to satisfy:
If all of the parties in a certain category fell consistently above
the median (or below, as the case may be), then we considered
the outcome meaningful, if we had a large enough sample size
of briefs for such party.
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Hypothesis 1: Partiesinvolved in the criminaljustice system are
more likely to have briefs written in a less complex style.
Our list of parties involved in the criminal justice system,
taken from the codes in the ALLCOURT database, includes: AC
(person accused, indicted, or suspected of a crime),
ARRESTEE (arrested person, or pretrial detainee), CC (person
convicted of crime), CRIM INS (person allegedly criminally
insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial), POOR D
(indigent defendant), PRISONER (prisoner, inmate of penal
institution) and PROBATIO, (probationer, or parolee). We put
in boldface all parties with briefs with significantly less complex
language. We found that every party involved in a criminal
matter, except probationers and parolees, had briefs written in a
significantly less complex style. The average scores for
probationers and parolees were sometimes above the median,
and sometimes below it, depending on which linguistic variable
we were looking at, and whether they were respondents or
petitioners. In sum, our hypothesis was proven.
Hypothesis 2: Partieswith presumablyfewer financial resources
are more likely to have briefs written in a less complex style. 34
Our list of parties with presumably fewer financial
resources, taken from the codes in the ALLCOURT database,
includes: ALIEN (alien, person subject to a denaturalization
proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked), DISABLED
(disabled person or disability benefit claimant), HANDICAP
(handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to), ICMP
(involuntary committed mental patient), INDIAN, POOR
(indigent, needy, welfare recipient), RETARDED (retarded
person, or mental incompetent), and UNEMPLOY (unemployed
person or unemployment compensation
applicant or
claimant).We put in boldface all parties with briefs with
significantly less complex language. We put in italics all parties

34. We were not able to conduct an independent statistical analysis to determine
whether these parties had fewer financial resources as a matter of fact. In other words, we
selected these parties based solely on anecdotal information. We also considered using a
separate group of parties "with presumably greater financial resources," but this turned out
to be too slippery a category.

92

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

with briefs with significantly more complex language. The
parties listed above that are neither in boldface nor italics did not
show a significant placement above or below the median for our
linguistic variables. In sum, our hypothesis was not proven.
Hypothesis 3: The federal government as a party is more likely
to have briefs written in a more complex style.
Our list of parties as federal governmental bodies (or
persons so representing), taken from the codes in the
ALLCOURT
database,
includes:
AF (Secretary
or
administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force), AG
(attorney general of the United States, or his office), AGRI
(Department or Secretary of Agriculture), CIA, CPSC
(Consumer Products Safety Commission), DOD (Department or
Secretary of Defense), DOS (Department or Secretary of State),
DOT (Department or Secretary of Transportation), EEOC,
EPA, FBI, FCC, FEC (Federal Election Commission), FERC
(Federal Energy Regulatory Commission), HEW, HHS
(Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services), INS,
IRS, LBR (Department or Secretary of Labor), and NLRB
(National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer).
This list includes in boldface all parties with briefs using
significantly more complex language. The only party in this
group filing briefs written in a less complex style was the
NLRB. In sum, our hypothesis was overwhelmingly supported.
Hypothesis 4: Southern states are more likely to have briefs
written in a less complex style.
The states shown in boldface below filed briefs written in a
significantly less complex style. The states in italics had briefs
written in a significantly more complex style. Not every state is
listed because some states did not have a high enough numerical
representation in our database (i.e., they had five or fewer
briefs), or they had enough briefs to represent a strong sample,
but had mixed results (i.e., with some scores above the median
and some below). ALABAMA, ARKANSAS, ARIZONA,
CALIFORNIA, CONNECTICUT, GEORGIA, ILLINOIS,
INDIANA, MASSACHUSSETS, MARYLAND, MAINE,
MINNESOTA, MISSOURI, MONTANA, NEW JERSEY, NEW
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YORK, OHIO, OKLAHOMA, OREGON, PENNYSLVANIA,
SOUTH DAKOTA, TENNESSEE, WASHINGTON, and
WISCONSIN. Fifteen states are in boldface, and nine states are
in italics. The boldface states (with less complex language)
include states that represent a range of geographical areas in the
United States. Nonetheless, of those nine states with more
complex language, all are "northern" states in a compassdirection sense of the word. We may in a later article lay out the
exact linguistic averages on a shaded map of the United States to
get a more accurate understanding of the relationship between
geography and linguistic complexity, but that exercise is beyond
the scope of this article. In sum, our hypothesis was neither
proven nor disproven, but our results suggest room for further
analysis.
Hypothesis 5: The gender or race of a party was related to the
complexity of the language in their briefs.
Our list of parties categorized based on gender or race,
taken from the codes in the ALLCOURT database, includes:
GOFEE (female governmental employee or job applicant),
GOMEE (minority governmental employee or job applicant),
FATHER, FEE (female employee or job applicant), MEE
(racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant), MFEE
(minority female employee or job applicant), MOTHER, RAMI
(racial or ethnic minority), RAMIPROT (person or organization
protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination),
RAMISTU (racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for
admission to an educational organization), and WIFE. We put in
boldface all parties with briefs with significantly less complex
language. Parties without boldface did not have enough briefs to
represent a legitimate sample size (or had no briefs at all). In
sum, our hypothesis was neither proven nor unproven, because
of sampling deficiencies.
Unique linguistic patterns for certain categories of parties
can be seen as the result of differences in two more fundamental
variables: (1) brief author and (2) brief subject matter (both legal
and factual). For criminal matters, both of these variables are
likely to influence linguistic outcomes. The authors of briefs in
criminal cases may be more likely to lack legal (or any
advanced) education, because such authors are sometimes the
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parties themselves (e.g., when a prisoner writes a brief from
prison). Moreover, when parties involved in criminal matters do
rely on counsel to write their briefs, they may require courtappointed counsel, or lawyers from firms that focus on criminal
cases, either of whom may bring linguistic patterns to their
writing that are not apparent for other brief-writers. The subject
matter of criminal cases, especially as shown in the statement of
facts, may be more likely to show less linguistic complexity,
because of the subject matter of criminal fact patterns.
Where the party is a person, agency, or department of the
federal government, the Office of the Solicitor General writes
the brief in any litigation before the Supreme Court.35 As our
results clearly show, such briefs are written in a significantly
more complex style. These results mirror the outcomes found
when the "Question Presented" (QP) component of the brief is
analyzed for linguistic patterns: The Office of the Solicitor
General has a significantly different QP style than all other brief
writers.3 6
In addition to the variables of party, law, and legal issue,
we looked for relationships between further variables in the
ALLCOURT database, and the linguistic variables we derived
from the Supreme Court briefs. More specifically, we compared
the readability scores (as well as other foundational data we
counted, e.g., the total number of words, sentences, complex
words, etc.) of briefs written: (1) for petitioners as opposed to
respondents;3 7 (2) for the party that ultimately won (before the
Supreme Court), as opposed to the party that lost; (3) in cases
that were decided by a five-four split (as a possible measure of
how controversial the litigation had been) as opposed to a
unanimous vote; and (4) according to a range of other nonsubstantive elements available to us in the ALLCOURT
database, (the Justice who ultimately authored the opinion, for
example). We found no significant relationship between our
35. The Office of the Solicitor General is tasked to conduct all litigation on behalf of
the United States in the Supreme Court, and to supervise the handling of litigation in the
federal appellate courts. 28 CFR 0.20.
36. Coleman et al., supra n. 2, at 332, 335, 340-43, 346-47, 350.
37. Usually it was easy to separate petitioners from respondents, although some cross
appeals (in which both sides are petitioners as well as respondents) and direct, noncertiorari, appeals to the Court (where the parties are labeled "appellant" and "appellee")
complicated matters somewhat.
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linguistic variables and any of these other factors; this did not
surprise us, but it was relatively straightforward to conduct a
comprehensive set of queries after the more laborious task of
database creation was complete. In sum, the only meaningful
variation in linguistic variables reiated to party, law, and issueas well as time, which we discuss next.
III. THE ANALYSIS: READABILITY AND TIME

In the following series of graphs, we portray changes in our
readability formulas over time, for each of the two longest brief
components: the Argument and the Statement of Facts.3 8
Necessarily, we tried to imagine as many confounding variables
as possible that would lead to only the appearance of a broad
based increase in the use of plain English (as manifested in
readability scores) over time. For example, we considered
whether our results were influenced by changes in Supreme
Court rules, or were skewed by historical changes in the
language of Supreme Court briefs as represented in the
percentage of 1) footnotes, 2) citations, 3) cases involving
certain areas of law (over others), and so on. We were not able
to completely eliminate the possibility of confounding variables,
but we are certain that our methodology (using different
linguistic measures, and the like), minimized any effect. 39
Figures 2A, 2B, and 2C graph the average readability
scores of the Argument component of all Supreme Court briefs
written on the merits from 1970 to 2004.

38. Both the Summary of Argument and the Conclusion showed no significant changes
over time in readability. Other components (for example, the Table of Contents and the
Table of Authorities) do not lend themselves to a readability analysis, for obvious reasons.
39. As the previous section found a relationship between certain parties and certain
legal issues on the one hand and readability on the other, it is natural to wonder if any
apparent changes over time in readability are actually functions of shifts in the percentage
of certain parties and issues over time. A representative sampling look at our specific data,
however, did not support this theory. Recall that for the general historical shift in
readability, the number of briefs we are using is much larger than the number of briefs (per
issue or per party) in the previous section. So the overall historical pattern should smother
all but the most pronounced shift in parties and legal issues over time, and we did not find
such an obvious shift.
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FIGURE 2A
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FIGURE 2B
Average of Flesch-Kincaid for Argument-PERL
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Figure 2A shows a decrease in the average Gunning Fog
Index from about 17.6 to about seventeen over our twenty-fiveyear time period. The average Flesch-Kincaid scores over the
same time period fell from approximately 13.9 to approximately
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13.4. The scores in figures 2A and 2B were derived from the
PERL software scripts that we created. In addition, to crosscheck our outcomes, we also used readability programs created
by Microsoft. The Microsoft formulas were not able to generate
any scores for the Fog Index; however they could produce
outcomes for both the Flesch-Kincaid and the Flesch Readability
Indexes. Figure 2C graphs the change in the Flesch-Kincaid
score using the Microsoft, rather than our PERL, scripts. We do
not include graphs of the Flesch Reading Ease scores, because
for the Argument component of the briefs, neither our own
PERL programs nor Microsoft's programs found significant
changes over time in these scores. Comparing figures 2B and
2C, we can see that the scores for the Flesch-Kincaid Index are
slightly different using PERL as opposed to Microsoft. This is
expected, as the two programs did not use the exact same scripts
to measure variables. Each program took a different approach to
the challenging problem of quantifying sophisticated linguistic
variables (automatically distinguishing periods that appear in
abbreviations from periods that end sentences, for example).
FIGURE 2C
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Figures 3A through 3D show changes in the average

readability scores of the Statement of Facts component from
1970 to 2004.
Figure 3A reveals that the average Fog Index of the
Statement of Facts decreased from about eighteen to about
fourteen from 1974 to 2000. Comparing this decrease to that of
the Argument section, we see that the average Fog score
decreased by significantly more in the Statement of Facts
component (18 - 14 = 4) than in the Argument component (17.6
-

17 =.6).

FIGURE 3A
Average of Fog for Statement of Facts-PERL
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Similarly, the average Flesch score for the Statement of
Facts has in the same time period gone up from approximately
thirty-four to approximately forty-two, as shown in Figure 3B on
the next page. Recall that in contrast to the other two indexes we
used-the Fog and the Flesch-Kincaid-the values reported by
the Flesch score should increase as readability improves. As our
Flesch results follow the increasing-value pattern, they show
patterns consistent with those revealed by the Fog.
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FIGURE 3B
Average of Flesch for Statement of Facts-PERL
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Figure 3C shows that the average Flesch-Kincaid of the
Statement of Facts decreased between 1970 and 2004 from
about 14.25 to about 10.5. As with the Fog results, the average
Flesch-Kincaid decreased more in the Statement of Facts (14.25
- 10.5

=

3.75) than in the Argument (13.9 - 13.4 = .5).

FIGURE 3C
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Figure 3D shows that the increase in the average Flesch
score using the Microsoft formula is about 6.5 (32.5 to 39). This
increase is comparable to the change in the average Flesch score
revealed in Figure 3B, using the PERL programs, of about eight
(34 to 42). Again, because of the subtle differences in the way
the two scripts measure variables, some difference is to be
expected, but both formulas show a strong, but steady, change in
average readability over the quarter century we studied.
FIGURE 3D 40
Average of Flesch for Statement of Facts-Microsoft
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Figure 3E, which appears on the following page,
demonstrates that the average Flesch-Kincaid measured by the
Microsoft formula decreased by approximately three (15 - 12 =
3) over twenty-five years. Compare this with the decrease of
3.75 in the average Flesch-Kincaid using the PERL program,
which is shown in Figure 3C.

40. Figures 3D and 3E are taken from Microsoft's readability algorithms, as opposed to
our PERL programs (which generated Figures 3A through 3C).
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FIGURE 3E
Average of Flesch-Kincaid for Statement of FactsMicrosoft
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As we anticipated, changes in average readability scores
were stronger in the Statement of Facts section of Supreme
Court briefs than in the Argument section. The Statement of
Facts almost always offers legal writers more stylistic and
structural flexibility than the Argument section. The factual
narrative, typically chronological, yet unencumbered by the
constraints of rule-based legal argument and the need for citation
to legal authority, should normally reveal more stylistic
freedom, and therefore more long-term variation, as a
consequence of external forces such as a greater emphasis on
writing plainly. Again, though, both the Argument and the
Statement of Facts components do reveal parallel changes in
readability over the quarter century of our data, even if the latter
component provides more striking evidence of this historical
shift.
To maintain full accreditation, American law schools and
legal educators must devote resources to improving the writing
skills of future attorneys. The American Bar Association's
curricular demands for law schools requires "writing in a legal
context, including at least one rigorous writing experience in the
first year and at least one additional rigorous writing experience
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after the first year."4 ' According to surveys of hiring attorneys,
law schools should be doing even more to produce quality legal
writing in their graduates; concerns about writing typically rank
42
at the top of the list in such surveys. Teaching law students to
write well is a multifaceted demand (including much more than
instruction in plain English, of course), but a look at the
curricula of contemporary legal writing programs, and the texts
used in such programs, reveals that "plain legal English" forms
an important component of this pedagogy at many law schools.4 3
But this has certainly not always been the case; the focus on
plain English has a long history, but only in recent years has it
gained significant strength, and it has paralleled the
professionalization (and relative standardization) of the legal
writing curriculum itself over the past couple of decades.4
If substantial resources are being spent on teaching law
students (and requiring practitioners) to write in a plainer way, a
natural question asks if the money is being spent successfully.
Over the past few decades, has the educational-and
regulatory-redirection towards plain legal English made any
difference in the way lawyers actually write? One method, as yet
untried, to answer that question would be through the use of
surveys or experiments testing practitioners who had graduated

41. Sec. of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, ABA, Standards and Rules of
Procedurefor Approval of Law Schools 21 (ABA 2008). A previous standard was less

specific, requiring schools to offer "(a) instruction in substantive law, values and skills,
including legal writing; (b) at least one rigorous writing experience; (c) adequate
opportunities for instruction in professional skills; and (d) live-client clinical
opportunities." Kenneth D. Chestek, MacCrate (In)Action: The Case for Enhancing the
Upper-Level Writing Requirement in Law Schools, 78 U. Colo. L. Rev. 115, 122 (2007)

(internal quotation marks omitted).
42. See e.g. Bryant G. Garth & Joanne Martin, Law Schools and the Construction of

Competence, 43 J. Leg. Educ. 469, 473, 477 (1993).
43. James M. Boland, Legal Writing Programs and Professionalism:Legal Writing
Professors Can Join the Academic Club 18 St. Thomas L. Rev. 711, 715 (2006). Our-

admittedly anecdotal-evidence from years of talking to colleagues around the country
about curriculum issues is that the vast majority of legal writing professors either require a
specific plain English text such as Richard Wydick's Plain English for Lawyers (5th ed.
Carolina Academic Press 2005) or use a textbook with some treatment of plain legal
English.
44. See Judith D. Fischer, Why George Orwell's Ideas about Language Still Matterfor

Lawyers, 68 Mont. L. Rev. 129, 133-35 (2007); see also Brady Coleman, Clarity and
Precision in Legislative Drafting: Case Studiesfrom Singapore Law (unpublished master's

thesis, University of Leicester 1998) (on file with author Coleman).
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from law school at different periods of time. We took a different
approach, choosing to rely on available data to resolve the issue.
To recap: our study chose a corpus of nearly 9,000 Supreme
Court briefs, representing a period of three and a half decades in
which the focus on plain legal English became increasingly
widespread, and used the average readability scores of such
briefs as a proxy for plainness in writing.45 If our most important
assumptions are accepted-that readability offers reliable
evidence of plainness, and that Supreme Court briefs provide an
acceptable representation of legal writing-then the following
conclusion is warranted: A gradual historical trend towards
plainer legal writing is revealed over recent decades.

45. Freshly minted law school graduates are less likely to write briefs to the Supreme
Court than are more senior attorneys, of course, although junior attorneys employed at the
Solicitor General's Office are presumably involved in the brief-writing process at a much
earlier stage in their careers, to offer just one possible counter-example. In any case,
although there is surely a delay between an education emphasizing plain legal English and
the evidence of that education in legal documents, the delay is apparently embedded in the
overall trend we found.

